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ECENTLY many groups have called for major for the resources or raw materials used in producing
tax reform. These groups maintain that the existing it. In other words, value added is equivalent to a
U.S. tax system has altered economic incentives and firm’s payment to the factors of production — land,
negatively influenced the performance of the econ- labor, and capital — in the form of rent, wages, in-
omy. One possible solution to this problem is for the terest, and profits.2 These payments represent the
United States to adopt a value-added tax (VAT) “base” to which a VAT would be applied.
similar to that used by European governments.1 This
article provides a general economic framework for A simplified example of how value-added can be
examining the current debate over the introduction of determined is shown in table 1, which illustrates a
a VAT into the U.S. tax system. hypothetical four-step process of converting wheat
into a loaf of bread. The miller purchases wheat from
the fanner at a price of 10 cents and sells the result-
BACKGROUND ing flour to the baker for 20 cents. Since one-half of the pnce to the baker represents the farmers receipts,
Value added is the difference between a firm’s re- 10 cents of the miller’s receipts represent the value
ceipts from the sale of a product and the payment added to the raw wheat during this stage of the pro-
duction process. After converting the flour into bread,
the baker sells the loaf of bread to the retailer for 1See, for example, Tax Restructunng Act of 197W proposed ________
by Rep. Al UlIman, chairman of the Joint Ways and Means
Committee. For an analysis of this proposal and a discussion 2For a brief discussion of the value-added concept, see John M.
of the value-added tax, see also Special Supplement,” Daily Blair, Economic Concentration (New York: Ilarcourt, Brace,
Report for Executives (October 22, 1979), pp. 2-26. Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), pp. 68-69.
Table 1
Calculating the Value Added
- Stage -- - - - Receipts Value-Added --
Farmer .10 .10 .10
2
Miller .10 .10 .20 .10 ( .20 .10~
3
Baker .10 -- .10 ± .10 .30 .10 (...30 .20)
4
Retailer .10 —- .10 —- .10 -~- .10 --.40 .10 ( 40- .30)
Final sales price to consumer $40
Total value added - 5.40
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30 cents. Since the cost of the flour was 20 cents,
the value added at this stage (the baker’s) is again
10 cents. Finally, out of the 40-cent retail price for
the loaf, the remaining 10 cents represents the re-
tailer’s value added.
The usefulness of this example is twofold. First, it
illustrates the fact that the final retail price to the
consumer is really nothing more than the sum of the
value added at each stage of production. Second, it
provides a format by which a sales tax can be dis-
tinguished from a VAT. A sales tax involves a single
payment by the consumer at the retail level and is
levied at a constant rate on the purchase price. The
VAT, on the other hand, is assessed at each stage of
production. If the sales tax rate and the VAT rate are
equal, the total tax revenue in the above example is
the same irrespective of the collection process.
There are two basic methods of calculating the
VAT.8 In the additive method, the tax base for the
VAT is the sum of the firm’s payments to the factors
used in producing the good. Under this scheme, the
VAT rate, say 10 percent is applied to the firm’s
costs in terms of wages, interest, rents, and profits.
Table 2 illustrates a hypothetical example of how the
additive procedure is used to calculate the VAT due.
Table 3 provides the information needed to calcu-
late the VAT payable under the second method,
the subtractive procedure. Essentially, this approach
makes the base to which the VAT rate is applied
equal to the difference between a firm’s sales receipts
and its cost of production (again, its value added).
The actual tax liability using this procedure is iden-
tical to that derived using the additive approach.
The Tax Base and Its Calculation
As noted before, the VAT base is usually calculated
as the difference between a firm’s sales receipts and
its cost of purchases from other firms. A debate exists,
however, over whether all of a firm’s costs should be
included in the calculation of the base or whether
special exemptions should be made. Exemptions from
the tax base are important because they determine
many of the economic effects of a VAT. Of particular
concern is the treatment of capital goods. There are
three general approaches to the treatment of capital
3The following discussion is found in a nnmber of writings.
See, for example, Advisory Commission on Intergovemmental
Relations, The Value-Added Tax and Alternative Sources
of Federal Revenue (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1973); John
F. Due, “The Value-Added Tax,” The Western Economic
Journal (Spring 1965), pp. 185-71; and, Richard W. Lind-
holm, Value-Added Tax and Other Tax Reforms (Chicago:
Nelson-Hall, 1976), pp. 30-35.
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Table 2







Value added .5600 000
Tax payable 5600.000 10% (VAT rate~ 560.000
sni I1(:~:.BiL-hJIIl W. I .indh,hn ¶ aba —.\dcled Tax a~1d
01/a. r ‘lax Jfrf’~i ‘u.s (Chicago. Ni I.., ‘ii-] Ta!].
1976;, pp. 30-31.
goods: the gross product, the income, and the con-
sumption approaches.
Under the gross product approach, firms are not
pennitted to deduct the purchase price of capital
goods when calculating their VAT base, nor are
they allowed to deduct the depreciation of existing
capital. The tax base at each stage of production,
therefore, includes wages, interest, rent, profits, and
depreciation. Since there is no deduction for either
capital goods depreciation or their purchase, the VAT
applies to all income earned in the production of the
firm’s output. Thus, in an economy-wide sense, the
tax base is associated with the value of gross national
product — the total current market value of all goods
and services produced or the total income derived
from theft production.
The income approach, on the other hand, does
allow firms to deduct capital depreciation from their
tax base. Since firms “use up” a percentage of their
existing capital stock each year, this approach taxes
firms on their net instead of gross income. The tax
base of the income-type VAT is analogous, therefore,
to the net national product of the economy.4
4An algebraic expression similar to the national income account
identities taught in elementary economic textbooks can aid in
distinguishing the income base of each type of VAT discussed.
Ignoring government expenditures, taxes, aud the foreign sec-
tor, the expression
CNP = C + I
shows the eqpivalence of total output or income eamed in the
economy and the sum of consumption (C) and investment
(I) expenditures. With no VAT exemptions, GNP is the base
of the gross income VAT, We define
I- D = I,
NNP = L + C
NY = NM’,
where I, is net investment, I) is depreciation, NY is nationalFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1980
Table 3
Calculating VAT Liability Via
Subtractive Procedure
Total sales ofgoods
and services $1 000,000
Total interest, dIvidends, and
rents received 200,000
Total (A) $1 200,000
Taxes $ 200,000
Purchase of materials, services,
power, and capital on which
VAT has been paid 300,000
Interest, dividends, and rents
paid to other firms 100,000
Total (B) $ 600,000
Value added AB
$600,000
Tax payable $600,000 10% (VAT rate) $60,000
SOURCE Lindho 1 Value Added Ta and Other Tax
Reforms, pp 30 31.
The third approach to the treatment of capital
goods, called the consumption approach, is the most
widely used VAT. It is the type that much of Europe
has adopted, that Congress is currently considering,
and that will be analyzed for the remainder of this
article. Under this scheme, each firm may deduct its
capital expenditures on plant and equipment in addi-
tion to depreciation. The tax base becomes the Rim’s
gross receipts less its purchases of materials and capi-
tal outlays (plant and equipment).5 In an aggregate
sense, the VAT base under the consumption approach
corresponds to the output of consumer goods or,
equivalently, income earned in producing consumer
goods.6
income, and NNP is net national product. The base of the
income-type VAT is CNP - D = NNP = NY, and the base
of the consumption type VAT is CNP — I = C, where I
I, + D. See Richard Musgrave and Peggy Musgrave, Public
Finance in Theory and Practice (New York: McGraw-RiB,
1973), p. 338.
5
Note that the dollar amounts of the income and consumption
bases are equivalent over time. “The main difference between
the two types is that, under the consumption concept, the
tax base is smaller the first year and slightly larger in the
following years. The total base added over the full deprecia-
tion period is identical under both methods.” Tax Foundation,
“A Value-Added Tax for The United States?” (June 1979),
p. 1.
°Nonnan Ture argues that the “consumption-type” label has
been misnamed. The name promotes the view that it is a
tax exclusively on consumption. Savers, who directly or in-
directly are owners of capital, do not escape the tax because
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE VAT
The effect of taxation on economic efficiency is
linked to the concept of potential output. Potential
output, as it relates to a market-type economy, may
vary according to incentives available in the market-
place. The economist defines these incentives in terms
of income and relative prices. To the extent that taxes
can alter economic incentives or the return to pro-
ductive activity, they induce changes in economic
behavior,
Economists use several criteria to judge the desira-
bility of a given tax or tax system. These criteria in-
volve both efficiency and equity considerations.
Neutrality
Price theory suggests that prices established in a
competitive market are reflections of both consumer
preference for goods and services and the least-cost
combination of inputs used to produce those goods.
A tax system is considered optimal if it does not
interfere with the price allocation mechanism estab-
lished in the market — that is, it is neutral toward
economic behavior. Although all taxes distort or alter
economic behavior to some degree, certain taxes can
be judged “superior” on efficiency grounds.7 VATpro-
ponents claim that the value-added tax would achieve
the objectives of neutrality toward both economic be-
havior and allocative efficiency.
A tax on each firm’s value added can be thought of
as a proportional tax on the firm’s use of the factors of
production. If each firm combines land, labor, and
capital in the most efficient (least-cost) manner, re-
sources are bid into their most productive use. Pay-
ments to these factors in a competitive market are
approximately equal to each factor’s contribution
to the market value of each firm’s output. Thus,
a uniform VAT on all firms imposes the same
proportional tax cost — with respect to each firm’s
payments to the sum of factor payments (value
added) — and is, therefore, neutral toward the choice
of production methods or the use of productive
resources.
value added by capital is subject to the tax. For a given
interest rate, the tax on the goods produced with capital
raises the amount of net income finns must derive from a
capital asset in order to justify its purchase. In other words,
the tax reduces the demand for funds and, other things re-
inaining the same, the interest earned by savers. See Charles
E. McLure, Jr. and Norman B. Ture, Value-Added Tax: Two
Views (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for
public Policy Research, November 1972), pp. 88-92.
T
For a treatment of the welfare costs of taxation, see Arnold
C. Harberger, “Taxation, Resource Allocation, and Welfare,”
Taxation and Welfare (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1974).
5FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1980
VAT: The European Experience
TheVAT is by no means a new idca. Fo]lowing W’nrld
War I. the pos.~ibi]itv ol miplt’ali’ntiu~ a \~fl’type Table A2
cystem Was disc-i ~sed in c-en ‘un European cnitntncs and
in the United States) Although the debate nmtinned Standard VAT Rates in EEC Countries
liver the nest Se’eral decides, it ss,is mt until (lie I9.50s
that a VA.T svslem was introduced in Irailce and in the Country Rate
slate of Michigan.2 Belgium . 16.0%
Denmark 20.2
Table Al France 17.6
Ireland 20.0
VAT Implemented Italy 14.0
Effective Luxembourg 10.0
Country Year Netherlands 18.0
- Belgium 1971 United Kingdom 6.0 Germany 120
Denmark 1967 _________________________________________________
France 1954 sOuncu:: Value-Added Tax (Arthur Anderson & Co.,
Ireland 1972 1979).
Italy 1973 The VAT was introduced in various En ropean coun—
Luxembourg 1970 trie4 is an alternative to turnover taxes. These turnover
taxes. s, ,rnctin‘Cs referred to as cascading ti Imover taxes,
Netherlands 1969 are characterw.ecl 1w the pa~ inent of taxes at each level
United Kingdom 1973 0~ prodi iction withoi t regard to reliel for the tax paid
West Germany 1968 at a prior sto.~c. hecansc if the way in which, these
tiNeS were nuplenu iiled. ii ‘crc was cin,sider’ihle ‘ri
I -i’ntive for a firm to to, tn,l all the stages of production
In all attempt to foster I nude between its members, (vertical mteqratinn). ,\lso. (bert’ was a variety of
the Council of the P.iirnpi’ao ltc-o,uunjc- (‘rnn,u,ut~ ri,ic’~ and rc’czmilationsal,out the taxation of certain cx—
(EEC) iss’ied a direct,’ e on April 1, 1 ‘.167, which re port.s rod iii ports. ssh cli red’ rue,I tIme fordtzn trade
ctiirecl all mc-mbe, nations t,, establish a VA’i’ svslem potemitial bc’tween lii’ cunntrie’.. The VAT proviclc’d for
liv January I, 1970.” Al thoi igh the directive c’:iu cr,iecl the general I ax c’seoiption of np’, I goods -and senicc’s.
Only the currejit i icrobers - — Belgium, France. ( ;cr— Thus, th , goal of the FEC in intr’iduring VAT was two.
mar,’-, Italy, Lnxc’mhn ,urg. a, ci the Netherlands —— it fold: to I urmonize U a’ ninabcr~t.r~5’ Sten is and to
was ustended to the United Kingdom, Denmark, and encourage intra-EEC trade.
Ireland upon their joiningthe EEC in 1973 (table Al). .. - -
\Vhile introduction d the \ A] svsteni ~ increased
Since most popular discussions of the VAT refer to the ,, . -
“European experience,” it may he useful to brieffy cx- foreign trade among the EEC nations, harmonization of
- the various tax systems is still lar from complete. As amine me oasis of its adoption and its record to date.
table A2 indicates, the standard VAT rate varies con-
siderably among the various EEC countric’s. Moreover,
tThe idea of the VAT originated with a German industrial- each country may choose to apply different rates to
ist by the name of F. Von Siemens. In 1918 he advocated various groups of goods and services. For ex.unplc’,
the substitution of the VAT for the newly implemented Belgium has two basic rates: a standard rate of 16.0
~ ~a~s ~daj~1su~e~ed using such~ha~ percent on necessities, and a 25.0 percent rate on lux-
was included in an amendment to the Revenue Act of ury goods. Likewise, Germany and the Umted Kmg-
1921 proposed by Sen. Reed Smoot. For a general discus- dom each have different rates for necessity and luxury
sion of the development of the VAT, see Due, “The Value- items.
Added Tax, p. 165,
2 In addition, each country exempts certain items from ~ arePIaj~m~fl for taxation. Although a complete listing would point out
from 1953 to 1967 when it formed the Sincrle Business the wide diversity of possible exemptions, there are
Tax. This tax was introduced primarily to replace existing several areas commonly exempted from VAT. As men-
business income taxes. tioned earlier, exports are fully exempt from VAT. Also,
iThis directive is reprinted in G.S.A. Wheateroft, Value- sales ?~ securities, stocks and bonds, doctors’ services,
Added Tax in the Enlarged Common Market (New York: financial services such as insurance and banking, and
John Wiley & Sons, 1973), Appendices I and II, postal services are generally exempt.
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A question remains regarding the neutrality of the
consumption or the income approaches. Economic
theory suggests that the consumption approach is less
distorting since it does not alter the individual’s
choice between consumption and saving (i.e., current
vs. future consumption).~The income approach, how-
ever, discriminates against saving since capital ex-
penditures are not deductible from the tax base.
Capital Formation and Growth
A common complaint about onr tax system is that
it discourages economic growth. VAT proponents
claim that a consumption-type VAT would not. Since
they believe that a reliance upon income taxation has
altered individual consumption-savings choicesthrough
the income tax’s impact on relative prices, proponents
argue that the VAT would support both a higher
level of savings and investment.9 Behind this argu-
ment lies the “double-tax issue,” one of the oldest
controversies in economics. In other words, “Should
taxes be based on consumption or on income?” Con-
sumption-base tax advocates claim that a tax levied
on income is also a tax on savings and is therefore
inefficient because it raises the “price” of saving (fu-
ture consumption) relative to current consumption.
Since a saver eventually is taxed on the interest earned
from present savings, some analysts argue that the
income is taxed twice. Hence, the double-tax issue.
The exemption of capital expenditures with a VAT
would offset the non-neutral aspects of the current
tax system, which relies heavily on income taxation,
and may result in a higher level of overall savings
and investment.iO
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social security taxes have altered the relative price of
work and leisure. These taxes, they claim, have in-
duced individuals to reduce their supply of labor at
prevailing market wages below which might otherwise
have been supplied without these taxes. Whether
VAT would correct these distortions depends upon
the relative responsiveness of labor to the removal or
reduction of the existing taxes and the changes in
relative commodity prices that may result from the
VAT.
Distribution of the Tax Burden
Another question of interest is “Who bears the bur-
den of taxation?” An economic examination of this
issue can be made through what economists call “in-
cidence analysis.” Incidence is the change in an indi-
vidual’s real income (nominal income adjusted for
changes in the price level) that results from the im-
position of a tax.i2
The key to understanding incidence lies in distin-
guishing between statutory incidence (the legal lia-
bility of the tax) and economic incidence (the final
burden of the tax). The sales tax provides a clear
example of this distinction. Although its legal liability
is imposed upon the retailer, the sales tax often is
assumed to be fully passed on to the individual who
purchases goods from the retailer. However, since the
prices of the retailer’s goods are now higher, the
quantity demanded will be reduced, and the owner’s
income therefore will be changed. In this case, the
economic incidence of the tax differs from the statu-
tory liability since the former takes into account both
the final resting point of the tax as well as the
economic ramifications on others (the retailer, for
example).
Tracing the final burden of a VAT is difficult be-
cause it ultimately depends upon the number of ex-
emptions. Assuming that the tax is applied equally
to all goods and services and is an “additional” tax,
its burden would be fully shifted to consumers.is If
‘2Taxes can affect real income in two ways. They affect indi-
viduals in their role as producers by affecting incomes
received from their supply of labor or capital. Alternatively,
taxes can affect real income by altering the purchasing
power of a given amount of nominal income — that is, the
tax alters prices in the marketplace.
iSIn other words, we ignore here the question of tax substitu-
tion — that other taxes may he reduced by the amount of
the tax increase. An analysis of “balanced-budget incidence”
— that is, the effect of the tax given an equal decline in
other taxes and the assumption that real government ex-
penditures are the same — is a more realistic approach and
will be discussed below.
7
In addition, VAT would directly affect labor sup-
ply.11 Some analysts contend that existing income and
5Despite the positive economic attributes of the VAT in its
more favorable consumption-type form, the tax is likely to end
up being less neutral than its theoretical construction. Critics
claim that political necessity requires that the tax be applied
with numerous exemptions. It has often been asserted that
exemption of certain categories of food, clothing, housing,
medicine, and a long list of other special categories would be
a political necessity. In addition to narrowing the overall tax
base of the VAT, numerous exemptions would erode the neu-
trahty of the tax, distorting the allocation of resources.
°See, for example, Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance,
pp. 468-69.
‘°Ofparticular concern is the responsiveness of savings to the
after-tax rate of return. Prehminary evidence indicates
that this response may be greater than was once thought.
See Michael J. Boskin, ‘Taxation, Saving, and the Rate
of Interest,” Journal of Political Economy (April 1978)
Part 2, pp. S3-S27. For an additional discussion of this
issue, see E. Philhp Howrey and Saul H. Hymans, “The
Measurement and Determination of Loanable Funds Saving,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (3: 1978), pp.
655-705.
11Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance, pp. 483-88.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1980
exemptions are allowed or if other taxes are reduced,
however, there will be changes in relative prices and
in the production mix of the economy.
Equity Criteria
Equity criteria are often used to evaluate different
taxes (and thus incidence patterns) - These criteria
attempt to answer the questions, “Who should pay
taxes?” and “How should the burden of taxation be
distributed among different individuals?” Although
objective economic analysis provides few answers to
these questions, it can provide a perspective on rela-
tive costs and benefits and on the trade-offs between
economic efficiency and equity considerations.
A principal equity concern is over the relative tax
burden imposed on individuals of different income
levels. The concept behind our income tax system, for
example, is that those individuals who earn a higher
income should pay a higher percentage of their income
in taxes. This is a “progressive” tax system. A “regres-
sive” tax, in contrast, takes a lesser proportion of in-
come from individuals who earn a larger income.
Critics of the VAT claim that it would be a regres-
sive tax since it taxes consumption and since lower
income individuals spend a larger proportion of their
incomes on consumption goods relative to higher in-
come individuals. Although this argument is straight-
forward, its validity depends on several unsettled
issues.
First, one might question the preceding analysis of
regressiveness on the grounds that it ignores the bene-
fit side of fiscal policy. In other words, the net bene-
fits derived from government spending or transfer
payments is not taken into account. Thus, a more
meaningful evaluation would include the benefits re-
ceived from government-related programs as well as
the costs.’4
On the other hand, the regressiveness of the tax
could be alleviated either by adjustments to the in-
come tax rate and/or by special tax credits. For ex-
ample, the exemption of necessity items such as food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care has been proposed.
These exemptions, however, would reduce the tax
‘
4
Edgar Browning argues that sales and excise taxes are pro-
gressive when analyzed in a general equilibrium context
with government transfer payments, See Edgar K. Browning,
“The Burden of Taxation,” Journal of Political Economy
(August 1978), pp. 649-71. Another description of this
view, along with an empirical investigation of the burden of
the U.S. tax system, is provided in Edgar K. Browning and
william H. Johnson, The Distribution of The Tax Burden
(American Enterprise Institute, Studies in Tax Policy, 1979).
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base and thus necessitate higher tax rates to insure
the same yield as under a comprehensive base ap-
proach. In general, therefore, attempts to alleviate the
regressiveness of the tax are likely to complicate the
administrative problems and interfere with the neu-
trality criteria discussed earlier.
Administrative Costs
The cost of administration is another criterion for
evaluating the merits of a tax system. The initial ad-
ministrative costs of introducing a VAT (or any other
tax for that matter) would be relatively high.
Perhaps the most important factor affecting the
cost of using a VAT is the degree of complexity of
the tax. The use of multiple rates and numerous
exemptions, in contrast to a single uniform rate,
would raise the administrative costs. Indeed, it has
been estimated that if the VAT system used involves
more than a single rate, administrative costs may
rise by 50 to 80 percent.’5 Most of this increase
would be due to increased personnel costs caused
by a rise in the amount of paperwork required of
both business and government.’6
Another consideration is whether the tax is used
to replace part of an existing tax or as a supple-
mentary source of government revenue. If the VAT
replaces only part of an existing tax or is merely
added to the present system, administrative cost
savings may be negligible. In fact, adding a VAT
may increase the current cost of the government’s
tax collecting apparatus. This can be seen by consider-
ing the influence on costs from a reduction in existing
tax rates. Since the previous tax system still exists
and since there is little or no change in collecting or
reporting procedures, the time and manpower in-
volved in collecting a5percent tax is essentially
the same as that for a 10 percent tax.
Furthermore, adding a VAT to the existing array
of taxes would have differential cost effects on busi-
ness. For instance, soon after a VAT was introduced
in Germany in 1968, small noncomputerized firms
estimated that tax-related administrative costs in-
creased up to 20 percent. Relatively large businesses,
~5NationalEconomic Development Office, Value-Added Tax
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1971) p. 41, cited
in Dan Throop Smith, et. al., What You Should Know About
the Value-Added Tax (Homewood: Dow Jones-Irwin, Inc.,
1973), p. 53.
16”It’s obviously possible to administer a VAT. But every exemp-
tion you put in makes it substantially more difficult to ad-
minister.” Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Emil Sunley,
quoted in Bureau of National Affairs, Daily Report for Execu-
tives (October 5, 1979), p. K-6.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
however, reported negligible administrative cost
increases.’7
The frequency of collection is also a significant
cost factor. Most of the European countries currently
using a VAT require monthly payments.’8 In the
United Kingdom, however, the collection period is
quarterly. Although a monthly payment schedule may
create cash-flow problems for some businesses, the
European experience suggests that this frequency is
feasible since most finns already record the data
needed to calculate their VAT liability on a monthly
basis.
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF VAT
Price Effects
A major concern about the implementation of a
VAT is the resulting price effects. The introduction
of the VAT, it has been widely asserted, will lead
to a one-time increase in the general level of prices.
In fact, it can be easily demonstrated that, although
a uniform VAT rate (an identical rate for all goods
and services) applied without exemption will not
alter relative prices within the economy, it will re-
sult in a one-time increase in the overall level of
prices.1°It should be noted, however, that this con-
clusion is based on several assumptions.
Perhaps the most important assumption is that
all sellers raise their prices by the exact amount of
the VAT, thus passing the additional cost on to the
consumer. There are several reasons why this actually
may not occur.
A VAT is usually applied with a varying rate
structure — for instance, a5percent rate on food
and a 10 percent rate on nonfood items — and/or
with some items exempt from taxation.2° If sellers
face different cost increases due to the VAT, then
it is uncertain that all prices will be raised by an
equal amount. Since none of these conditions will
lead to identical increases in all prices, the con-
sequent relative price changes would induce a sbift-
~
T




For a discussion of the various collection periods, see the
articles contained in G.S.A. Wheatcroft, Value-Added Tax
in the Enlarged Common Market (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1973). This monthly scheme also appears to be favored
by some U.S. officials. A comparison of views may be found
in Daily Report for Executives (October 5, 1979), pp. K7-
KS.
10
Mm F. Friedlaender, “Indirect Taxes and Relative Prices,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 1967), pp. 125-
39.
20
See supplement, page 6.
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ing in the pre-VAT pattern of demand for goods
and services. In this way, the production (and em-
ployment) decisions of producers are affected by the
introduction of a VAT.
Introducing a VAT may cause a one-time change
in the level of prices if the tax is merely a supple-
ment to existing taxes. It is generally assumed that
firms face higher costs because of the VAT and,
therefore, attempt to pass this on to consumers. How-
ever, if the tax burden is reduced in some other area—
for instance, the reduction in firms’ contributions
to social security — then this assumption is un-
warranted. To determine the final price effect of a
VAT in this case requires knowledge of the tradeoff
between reductions in existing taxes (if any) and
the cost to the firm of administering the VAT.
Finally, it is unlikely that a rise in the general
level of prices can be maintained without an in-
crease in the money stock held by the public or
an increase in the velocity of the existing money stock
(decline in real money balances). If neither of these
situations occurs, then changes in production and
employment will occur since consumers would not be
able to maintain previous consumption levels at the
higher level of prices. Thus, the reaction of the gov-
ernment to observed changes brought on by the
initial price effects of a VAT may further compli-
cate the foregoing analysis.
Interjurisdictional Intrusion
How VAT might interfere with existing state and
local taxes is also an important issue. State and
local governments likely will be apprehensive about
a VAT, given that the tax appears to be an intru-
sion into an area upon which these governments
traditionally have relied — namely, the sales tax. Con-
tinued use of the retail sales tax should not conflict
with federal use of the VAT from an economic effi-
ciency view, however. If the VAT is applied at a
uniform rate, relative prices will not be affected.
Some have argued, however, that a VAT may
change taxpayers’ perceptions of the cost of govern-
ment expenditures and may alter the level of public
services demanded. If the tax is “invisible” or hidden
in the price of goods, taxpayers may demand a
higher level of public expenditures since the costs
are not fully perceived. On the other hand, if the
tax is fully perceived at the retail level (for example,
if the VAT portion is stated separately at purchase),
consumers may object to additional retail sales taxes,
and state and local governments will find it more
difficult to tax by this method.
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Stabilization Summary
An important feature of a tax system is its over-
all response to cyclical fluctuations in the economy.
For a given set of tax rates, the growth of the tax
base normally will change with the level of aggregate
economic activity. Provided that the change in tax
revenues does not affect the level of government
spending, these changes will cause variations in the
overall budget surplus or deficit. “Built-in flexibility”
is said to exist if tax liabilities rise (and fall) at a
faster rate than income, Our tax system, based pri-
marily on a progressive income tax, posits that the
overall federal budget has a stabilizing effect on
the economy since the tax acts to dampen fluctua-
tions in economic activity. A substitution from in-
come and social security taxes to a VAT likely would
reduce such built-in flexibility.2’
The purpose of this article has been to provide
a general background for understanding the value-
added tax. Recent examinations have narrowly ad-
dressed the tax’s price effects and its potential to
reduce the existing tax burden imposed by federal
income and social security taxes. While these are
indeed important issues, a complete analysis of VAT
must go deeper, examining the tax base, its neutral-
ity, regressiveness, incidence, and effects on capital
formation. In addition, the administrative costs of the
tax itself must be considered as well.
2’Stated altematively, a tax whose income elasticity of yield is
greater than one is considered an automatic stabilizer. Elas-
ticity is defined as the percentage change in tax yield divided
by the percentage change in income (consumption) base.
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